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Of al1 the bo rdera-nds 4 f the Swiet UYnion, a
vides the st favorarble conditions f tb developmentm of strong
nationality movements, The fallowing c rcumstances account for this
a relatively isolated location, Transcaucasia being removed a good
distance from the center of Russia and protected by two seas and a
range of high mountains- ancient native cultures capable of facing
Russian culture on a certain footing of equality: a numerous local
intell'gentsia, and an economy which, In relation to the USSR as a
whole, is -n the decline-
Amilng the native nationalities the Georgians have shown over
the past fifty years the greatest degree of cultural and demographic
dynamism Although less urbanized that the Armenians and less fertile
than the Azeri Turks they have demonstrated the most steady population
grwth. Their population is highly concentrated. They have probably
the highest proportil-n of persains with a middle and higher education
of any borderland area in the Soviet Union, which means that they
dispose of a large intelligentsia t, carry out administrative and
ec-an-mie functions. They have shown no tendency to assimilate, and
indeed have themselves been assimilating some of the minor Transcau-
caslan groups. And finally, between 1932 and 1953 they enjoyed,
thanks t, the Georgian -wrigin of Stalin and Beria, a certain privileged
pcsIt on in Soviet Society, All these factorg have helped to et ih
2a Georgian hegemony in Transcaucasia.
In reaction to this the two other major nationalities, the
Armenians and Azeri Turks, have tended to draw together in a common
front against the Georgians. The Armeno-Turkic rapprochement was
assisted by the fact that most of the causes which had engendered
their mutual hostility before the revolution are gone. The reli-
gious conflict has subsided as a result of the elimination of reli-
gion from public life; the social conflicts.hae been undermined by
the destruction of the Armenian middle class; and the racial antagn-
ism, prompted by the persecution of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire,
has lost much of its intensity because there no longer is any Armenian
problem in Turkey. The Armenians and Azeri Turks, regarding them-
selves (and not without justice) as second-rate citizens in regard to
the Russians and Georgians, find a certain community of interest in
opposing their more powerful neighbors.
In Transcaucasia, the Russians play a relatively minor role.
They have never exceeded 15 per cent of the total population, and
have been largely confined to the two major cities, Baku and Tiflis.
There is no evidence of any increase in the number of Russians residing
in Transcaucasia after the war. In fact, it is more than likely that
the Russians have actually been leaving Transcaucasia as a result
of the gradual shift of the petroleum industry from Baku and environs
to the Urals.
3In their Transcaucasian policy the Communists have tended to
follow a divide et impera policy, with slight favoritism toward
the Armenians. The Armenians, as the least nationalistic, least
land-rooted group are the natural allies of Soviet power with which,
in addition, they share a common tradition of hostility to the
Ottoman Turks.
There is thus something akin to a balance ofpower in Transcau-
casia. On the one hand are the Georgians, on the other the Armenians
and Azeri Turks, the former of whom enjoy a certain measure of Soviet
and Russian support. In all three republics, however, (except to
some extent in Azerbaijan) the local regimes are native in composi-
tion and orientation. The Russians here seem less to rule (directly
at any rate) than to supervise. The position of Transcaucasia in the
Soviet empire resembles more closely that of a satellite than of a
borderland area. For some time Russia's primary interest in this
area has been strategic.
Economically, Transcaucasia has been developing less rapidly
than the USSR as a whole. This fact can be illustrated in several
ways. One is to look at the history of the republican budgets. Be-
fore World War II Transcaucasia's share of the all-Union republican
budgets (ie., moneys allotted by the government for local use) was
customarily around 10-12 per cent. After the war it dropped to 6
per cent, and it has been declining ever since, having dropped last
4year to an all-time low of 4.4 per cent. Another way of illustrating
this decline is to trace Transcaucasia's share in Soviet industrial
growth. The growth of industrial output in the three Transcaucasian
republics since 1940 has been consistently slower than in the USSR.
This holds especially true of the two most industrialized republics,
Azerbaijan and Georgia.
The relative economic decline produces a variety of effects which
are not without bearing on the nationality question in this area. On
the one hand, the population, and especially the intelligentsia, is
dissatisfied by material deprivation caused by the failure of the
Soviet regime to invest heavily in this region; the slow development
of housing facilities is only one of the deprivations. On the other
hand, an area lying outside the mainstream of Soviet economic develop-
ment enjoys a measure of autonomy and freedom from Russian population
pressure which areas of intense economic growth do not. Both these
factors are propitious for local nationalism.
From the point of view of cultural development, the Transcaucasian
nationalities seem to have been undergoing a process of secularization
and Westernization, through the medium of Russian culture, observed in
other borderland regions of the Soviet Union. If the process here is
somewhat less dramatic than elsewhere it is because it got underway
some time before the Communist conquest, and in some ways goes back
to the mid-19th century.
5Broadly speaking, in the past fifty years the population of
Transcaucasia has been transforming itself from a loose agglomeration
of small group whose loyalties were to their religion and locality
into three cohesive nationalities. This process of transformation
was spontanenous in its impetus, but it was also assisted, for reasons
which cannot be gone into here, by the Soviet regime. The three
nationalities are, of course, the Georgians, the Armenians, and the
Azeri Turks. The Georgian nationality has emerged through the fusion
of the various Kartvel groups (including the Mingrelians, Svanetians,
and Imeretians) and the assimilation of some minor Christian groups
of non-Kartvel origin. The Armenians in particular have proved them-
selves succeptible to the lure of Georgian culture, and a certain pro-
portion of the Armenian population residing in Georgia has become
linguistically assimilated. The Azeri Turks have been absorbing the
smaller Muslim nationalities, while the Armenians, whose loyalty to
their culture is least developed, have assimilated some Kurdish groups.
None of the three principal Transcaucasian groups has shown itself
susceptible to Russification. In Georgia the use of Russian is
virtually unknown in the villages and smaller towns, and even the
intelligentsia (including leading members of the Academy of Sciences)
speak it poorly.
Intermarriage between Russians and natives is rare, although
not as exceptional as in Central Asia. Due to their common
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religious heritage, intermarriage involves for Russians, Armenians,
and Georgians less of a break with their cultures than it does for
Russians and Muslims. But the cultural gap is wide enough -to prevent
intermarriage from assuming significant proportions. Georgians have
told this writer that Russians and Georgians at the university fre-
quently dated each other. But the question whether they also married
elicited an emphatic "no". The reason given was"difference in cus-
toms and traditions". This is less of a factor in cases of intermar-
Jage involving Armenians. The Armenians who marry outside their
nationality, whether with Russians or Georgians, seem to become
assimilated, and their children are no longer considered Armenians.
Despite growing "modernization" of local life, social customs
seem to survive. An example of this is the local attitude toward
the gainful employment of girls and young women. Traditionally,
Transcaucasians regarded it as highly improper for women to work
outside the home. The Communists, for reasons which are obvious, have
been very anxious to alter this attitude, and to drive able-bodied
women to work. One of the methods which they employed and still
employ is to pay such low wages to the men that the female members of
the family too must seek work. Despite this economic pressure one
almost never sees in Tiflis a Georgian girl in a place of public
employment; on those jobs where women are usually employed (eg., in
restaurants and on street-cars) they are invariably Russian. The reason
7for this unwillingness of Georgian girls to find jobs is the strict
conception of morality which Georgians apply to their own race. A
woman publicly employed is subjected to such abuse that with the
best intention she cannot maintain the self-respect which natives
expect of her. Conversations with natives confirm the impression
that Georgian gizls past the age of adolescence stay home under
their mother's watchful eye.
The natives display much the same traditionalism in their other
habits and attitudes, including food. In this respect the situation
in Transcaucasia does not differ from that observable in any other
area inhabited by minorities.
In view of the absence of all data it is very difficult to form
any opinion of the attitude of the natives toward foreign powers. One
thing, however, is fairly certain. The pro-Western, pro-Russian, and
pro-Turkish attitudes which characterized respectively Georgian,
Armenian, and Azerbaijani politics before the revolution have become
significantly modified. Two factors account for this: the memory
of actual independence during 1918-21, intensified by the trappings of
pseudo-independence provided by the Communists since 1921, and the
emergence of a host of new Middle Eastern states after World War II.
Both mean that the Transcaucasian nationalities can rely more heavily
on their own resources and on alliances with the new Middle Eastern
states, and less on the Western powers and Russia. As for Azerbaijan
and Turkey there is little reason to suspect deep feelings of sym-
pathy between them. Thanks to its colonial status Azerbaijan has
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developed in some ways more rapidly than Turkey, and if the experience
of Azeri Turkic DP's is any indication, Ameri intellectuals consider
themselves more truly "Western" than their Turkish cousins. In other
words, today the Western powers and Turkey can count less on the polit-
ical sympathies of the Transcaucasians than in the decades preceding
the revolution. The cultural pull to the West, on the other hand, is
every bit as strong among the youth of Transcaucasia as it is among
the youth of Russia, and if anything stronger than it was before 1917.
